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Judicial Efficiency in Asbestos
Litigation
Honorable Alfred Chiantelli
You have heard and will hear arguments regarding policy. It is like
listening to people talk about recipes on tort refinement. I am not here to
talk about the recipe. I am the cook. Let me tell you about the City and
County of San Francisco. We have 750,000 people and fifty judges.
Thirteen judges exclusively hear civil cases.
In the 1980s, we decided that the California Code of Civil Procedure
would not work with complex litigation, so we started issuing our own
general orders in San Francisco in order to get asbestos cases to court. One
thing we found is that our settlement conferences did not resolve asbestos
cases. Given this situation, we decided that we had to move these cases to
trial, because we were not going to sweep them under a rug and allow them
to collect dust.
We have a caseload of approximately two thousand mesothelioma cases
in San Francisco. Lately, we have seen a lot more mesothelioma and other
cancer cases than in the past. We also find that our cases have shifted from
asbestos exposures around docks to cases based on exposures on land.
In dealing with the large inventory of asbestos claims, we decided to
consolidate the plaintiffs' cases. Eleven months after the filing of a
complaint, our master calendar judge will conduct a status-setting
conference where he or she will consolidate anywhere from five to about
twenty-five cases, and then we set a trial date. To avoid matching diamonds
with zircons, we consolidate cases according to similar injury. Each plaintiff
firm is assigned its own consolidated cases. So, if plaintiffs' lawyer Alan
Brayton has a case, or several cases in San Francisco, we will consolidate all
his asbestosis cases in which the plaintiffs are still living. Then we will have
another Brayton group that will include all wrongful death asbestos cases,
and so on.
With these consolidations, each plaintiffs case will have anywhere from
two to fifteen defendants. Consolidating cases by disease categories is not a

gold mine, but it is not a land mine either, which does occur when you begin
to consolidate cases without attention to the commonality of diseases. That
has happened in other states where judges have joined cases that do not
belong together; the cases have been mixed in a judicial cuisinart. Many of
you law students have taken courses in criminal law. You know that the
courts will not consolidate a death penalty murderer with a petty theft
arrestee. In asbestos cases, courts have to consolidate with consideration of
the seriousness of the disease and sometimes according to the plaintiff's
occupation.
Moreover, through a special order, we decided to have one master
complaint and one master answer. We told the plaintiffs they should put
down each and every theory of recovery on their master complaint. We also
told the defense attorneys to put down every affirmative defense and to deny
as much as possible. Now, when an attorney files a case, he or she files a
sheet of paper and simply refers to the standard complaint. Defendants refer
to the standard answer. This saves time and money.
We also discovered that we, as superior court judges, had an inherent
power to do certain things that the California Civil Code of Procedure would
not allow us to do because we were involved in complex litigation. That
issue went up to the court of appeals, and we won. The appellate court
indicated that we had the inherent power, derived from the California
Constitution, to issue such an order. In exercising reasonable control over
complex litigation and discovery matters, we could act with the inherent
managerial powers of the court in reference to this type of work.
We were able to issue a general order appointing a law firm as
designated defense counsel to perform primarily administrative functions,
such as scheduling medical expert witness depositions and medical exams
for all the defendants. We also tailored several other procedural rules for
asbestos litigation. In order to make discovery automatic, we ordered that
standard interrogatories be placed on file. We also require plaintiffs to
respond to defense interrogatories within fifteen days of first service of any
complaint. Interrogatories are to be answered without objection, except for
attorney-client or work product privilege.
Within 120 days of a defendant's first appearance in a pending case, the
defendant shall serve standard answers on all counsel. We have also
allowed an expedited summary judgment procedure in which a defendant
may file notice of a request for an expedited summary judgment claiming
that the plaintiff has provided no information with respect to the identity of
the product or site involved. This motion can be filed after the plaintiff's
deposition. After signing such a certification, the plaintiff must respond if
there are triable issues of fact. If there is no response, the complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.
When I was a presiding judge in the San Francisco Superior Court, I
decided to take a snapshot of the number of cases that went to a jury trial.
Between January of 2001 and July of 2001, 1 counted the cases sent to jury
trial. They were all consolidated cases. I counted the number of plaintiffs
and the number of defendants that corresponded to each plaintiffs case. I
counted them each as a separate trial. Next, I sent them to the jury trial
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department. There were approximately 450 sent out to jury trial. There
were only twelve verdicts, which demonstrates that when asbestos cases are
sent for jury trial, most settle or are dismissed, but not before cases are set
for trial. These cases must be sent to the trial department because the parties
want to see the whites of the jurors' eyes. Therefore, an order was issued.
Addressing the loss of jurors under our new jury rules, jurors serve one
day or one trial. Under this system, any juror not picked to serve on a jury
trial on the first day of service is exempt from service for the year. Jurors
used to ask for excuses from service, saying: "I'm not sure if I can serve on a
trial that is going to last six to eight months." So we issued an order
instructing judges that asbestos trials may not extend longer than thirty days.
The judge's first reaction was: "What do you mean thirty days? We have
fifteen plaintiffs and 100 defendants." It is possible, because if you look at
my snapshot picture, the court is only going to receive two verdicts from that
consolidated case. So we tell the jurors that the trial will not take four to six
months and that it will not last more than thirty days. One smart defense
attorney asked: "What happens if they go beyond thirty days?" We
responded that we would declare a mistrial.
In any event, we have been fairly successful in getting a big turnover in
our asbestos cases. Let me tell you some other things. What are some of the
new theories that we are seeing? In San Francisco, plaintiffs' lawyers have
tried to push the envelope. They have been successful with some new
theories, but not with others.
For example, let's discuss the substantive law of conspiracy. In criminal
law, we all know that conspiracy is a crime in itself. You have an
agreement, you have an overt act, and then you have a crime. The fact that
the target offense of the conspiracy cannot be achieved due to impossibility
is no defense to a crime of conspiracy. Conspiracy is a crime by itself.
In civil law, however, conspiracy is not even a cause of action. It is
used to create vicarious liability. In asbestos cases, some of the plaintiffs'
firms will charge a defendant manufacturer with the theory of conspiracy.
They will claim that the manufacturer did not produce the asbestoscontaining product, but was a member of a trade guild that included a
company that did manufacture the product. Plaintiffs' firms use this
connection to argue that the defendant company, who is not the perpetrator,
should be held vicariously liable for the actions of another company. Our
appellate court recently held that one company cannot be liable for the
actions of another under a theory of conspiracy. Although it did not use
these words, the appellate court might have meant that, if it is impossible for
a company to be liable for a tort because it owed no duty, it is legally
impossible for the defendant to commit that tort. A company cannot be
liable for belonging to a trade guild with the actual perpetrator. It appears

that the conspiracy theory has been removed from consideration by
plaintiffs' lawyers.
The appellate court still must address many other issues. For example,
plaintiffs pursue premises owners, including refineries, shopping malls, and
commercial centers on the theories of retained control and negligent
provision of unsafe equipment. The plaintiffs argue that the premises
owners had a non-delegable duty.
Plaintiffs have also shifted their focus away from large manufacturers
and distributors that are now bankrupt to general contractors. This has
caused plaintiffs' lawyers to shift from product liability law to the common
law theory of negligence in pursuing new defendants. Plaintiffs are also
bringing strict liability claims against makers of small appliances, such as
hair dryers and toasters. Finally, they are bringing cases against so-called
friction defendants, such as those who manufacture automobile or airplane
brakes.
There is one other matter that I want to talk about, and that is the issue
of "what it means to have an injury?" I remember in law school torts class
we learned that a person must have a physical injury in order to get into
court. I have looked at some of the proposals for reforming tort law. If,
because of someone's negligence, a person is injured and has a scar on his or
her leg, but still can walk and run and jump, can that person get into court
because of a disfigurement? An asbestos claimant might not have interstitial
fibrosis, but there is some biological change inside that person. I do not like
the theory that allows only the most seriously injured into court. What about
the people who are less seriously injured? I rue the day when such people
lose their right to jury trials.

